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Abstract The central observation of this paper is that belief ascriptions with plu-
ral subjects can be interpreted non-distributively, so that beliefs can be truthfully
attributed to a plurality that cannot be attributed to any of the individuals that it
comprises. Moreover, the beliefs of a plurality appear to be predictable from the
beliefs of its associated individuals. Two potential analyses are offered for the re-
lationship between the beliefs of individuals and those of pluralities. Both of these
analyses, which are meant to negotiate the agreements and disagreements between
individual experiencers, run into issues differentiating between relevant and irrele-
vant disagreement. To resolve these issues I invoke a notion of “aboutness”, which
filters out contextually irrelevant beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Attitude ascriptions with plural subjects are typically interpreted distributively. For
example, consider the sentences in (1):
(1) a. Alexis and Brian think that Cass left.
b. Alexis and Brian want Cass to leave.
c. Alexis and Brian wish that Cass had left.
d. Alexis and Brian regret that Cass didn’t leave.
On a default interpretation of (1a), there is an entailment that Alexis believes that
Cass left, and that Brian does, too. Similar inferences hold for want, wish, and regret
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in (1b), (1c), and (1d), respectively. This is of course in contrast to non-distributive
interpretations of plurals as in (2), which entails neither (3a) nor (3b):
(2) Alexis and Brian ate the whole pie.
(3) a. Alexis ate the whole pie.
b. Brian ate the whole pie.
This paper is dedicated to demonstrating the possibility of, and subsequently an-
alyzing, non-distributive attitude ascriptions, and more specifically, non-distributive
belief ascriptions. In Section 2 I set forth the data to be accounted for, a variety of
context-sentence pairs in which beliefs are truthfully attributed to pluralities that
cannot be attributed to the individuals that those pluralities comprise. Once the
possibility of non-distributive belief ascription is established, the problem then be-
comes one of elucidating the relationship between the beliefs of pluralities and the
beliefs of their corresponding individuals, as well as the effects this relationship
has on semantic interpretation. The rest of the paper thus straddles the line between
semantics proper—that is, concern over the denotations of lexical items and their
semantic composition—and what Bach (1986) famously refers to as natural lan-
guage metaphysics, i.e., the study of the model used for semantic interpretation.
In Section 3 I offer two analyses of the data presented in Section 2, abstaining
from any decision as to which is the superior proposal. The first theory puts the bulk
of the work in the natural language ontology, positing that the beliefs of pluralities
are related to the beliefs of individuals in a manner formally similar to premise-
semantic approaches to modals and conditionals along the lines notably discussed
by Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012) and Lewis (1981). The second theory opts for
a simpler metaphysics by transferring a certain amount of the first theory’s work to
the semantic interpretation of plurals.
I show in Section 4 that there is a problem for both of these analyses: while each
is successful at negotiating relevant (dis)agreements when going from individual to
plural experiencers, neither allows for the important distinction between relevant
and irrelevant disagreement between individuals. I resolve this issue by invoking
a notion of “aboutness”: beliefs are about situations, and it is by means of prag-
matically fixing the “about-situations” to which we make reference that we filter
out those beliefs that are contextually irrelevant. Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks, as well as areas for future inquiry.
2 A tour through the data
Our first example of a non-distributive belief ascription can be seen in (4), which is
interpretable as true in the context provided:
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Sam owns a construction company and has six clients, none of whom know
of the others’ existence. She has convinced each client that she would build
a house for him. In reality, she is a con artist and built no houses at all.
(4) (In total,) Sam’s six clients think she built six houses for them.
Given the context, it is clear that no individual client thinks that Sam built six
houses, meaning that the interpretation that makes (4) true cannot be a distribu-
tive one. Moreover, (4) cannot be accounted for via a de re construal of six houses
in conjunction with some mereological wizardry in the matrix clause, as could con-
ceivably be done for a sentence like (5).
(5) There are six houses that Sam’s six clients think she built for them.
After all, the nature of Sam’s dishonesty is such that there are no six houses to
serve as witnesses for such a de re construal, hence why (5) is false in spite of (4)
being true. It seems, then, that the best analysis of (4) is simply that it serves as
an account of the cumulative beliefs of six individuals: each client thinks he got a
house, so their conjoined belief is that they got six houses.
As another example, consider (6):
Paul just got married, and his cousins Arnie and Beatrice, who have never
met, just caught wind of it. Arnie suspects that Paul’s husband is rich, and
has no other relevant opinions. Beatrice thinks he’s a New Yorker, and has
no other relevant opinions.
(6) Paul’s cousins think he married a rich New Yorker.
A distributive reading of (6) is once again false, since neither Arnie nor Beatrice
believes that Paul’s husband is a rich New Yorker. What’s more, in this case there
are no obvious alternative mereological tricks available, since there is nothing in
the embedded clause for any mereological operator to actually operate on. It thus
appears that the best explanation is the simplest one: we conjoin the beliefs of the
individuals to get the beliefs of the plurality, so that Arnie’s belief that Paul’s hus-
band is rich is conjoined with Beatrice’s belief that he is a New Yorker, leading to a
belief of Arnie-plus-Beatrice that he is a rich New Yorker.
Notice that in the cases considered thus far, the individual experiencers’ relevant
beliefs have been mutually compatible. In (4), each client is agnostic about the exis-
tence of other clients, so that Client 1’s beliefs are compatible with, but do not entail
the existence of a house built for Client 2 (for example). Similarly, while Arnie’s
beliefs in (6) do not entail that Paul married a New Yorker, they do not contradict it
either, and likewise for Beatrice and Paul’s husband’s wealth. The result seems to
be that the beliefs of the plurality are a conjunction of the beliefs of the individuals:
six house-beliefs are conjoined to make one six-house belief, and a wealth belief
and a New Yorker belief are conjoined to make a rich New Yorker belief.
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But what happens when the beliefs of the individual experiencers don’t play
together so nicely? In the context below, which is a revision of the original wed-
ding scenario, Arnie and Beatrice’s beliefs are mutually contradictory. This context
renders the original (6) false, while the disjunctive sentence in (7) is true:
Arnie thinks that Paul married a rich Marylander, while Beatrice thinks he
married a poor New Yorker.
(7) Paul’s cousins think he married either a rich Marylander or a poor New
Yorker.
From this one might be tempted to conclude that while mutual compatibility leads
to conjunction of beliefs (rich + New Yorker = rich and New Yorker), incompat-
ibility leads to disjunction of beliefs (rich Marylander + poor New Yorker = rich
Marylander or poor New Yorker). But such a conclusion is not yet warranted: the
sentence in (7) is also true on a distributive reading, since each cousin believes the
weak proposition denoted by the clausal complement in (7). This in turn means that
the truth of (7) cannot be used to bolster a particular view about the relationship be-
tween the beliefs of individuals and the beliefs of pluralities, since there is a reading
of (7) that is true regardless of what that relationship is.
However, with some slight tweaking we can devise a context-sentence pair such
that a distributive reading is false, but the prior observation about conjunction vs.
disjunction is still observed. Consider the sentence (8) in the context provided:
Paul has three cousins, Arnie, Beatrice, and Kate. Arnie and Beatrice’s be-
liefs are as in the original wedding scenario: rich and New Yorker, respec-
tively, and otherwise agnostic. Kate, like Beatrice, is unopinionated about
Paul’s husband’s wealth, but she thinks he’s from Iowa, not New York.
(8) Paul’s cousins think he married a rich man from either New York or Iowa.
A distributive reading of (8) is false: Arnie is not committed to Paul’s husband’s
being from New York or Iowa, while Beatrice and Kate are not committed to Paul’s
husband’s being rich. Nonetheless, (8) is true. Moreover, we see the informally
stated generalization in action: where there is incompatibility, there is disjunction
(New York or Iowa), and where there is compatibility there is conjunction (rich and
[New York or Iowa]).
Now that the evidence for non-distributive belief ascriptions is on the table, in
the next section we will explore how semantics and ontology might work together
to produce the judgments discussed in this section. I will offer two possible anal-
yses, each of which derives our informal observation that compatibility leads to
conjunction, and incompatibility to disjunction.
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3 Two analyses
3.1 Basic assumptions
Before introducing the two analyses, let’s go over some basic assumptions. I as-
sume a theory of attitude semantics that is both (I) (neo-)Davidsonian, in that the
denotations of sentences involve an existentially quantified-over variable over even-
tualities introduced by the verb (Davidson 1967); and (II) Hintikkan, in that the de-
notations of attitudes like believe (and think) universally quantify over accessible
worlds (Hintikka 1969). I also follow Kratzer (1996) in treating the external argu-
ment as “severed” from the verb and introduced separately by a voice head, though
this assumption is not crucial to the theory espoused here. As a result of these as-
sumptions, the denotation of believe (and think) will be as in (9), where Dox(e) is
the set of doxastically accessible worlds; this definition will undergo some minor
revisions in Section 4. The ensuing denotation for a simple belief ascription can be
seen in (10), where Exp(e) is the experiencer of e, and a is Arnie.
(9) JbelieveKctake 1 = λ pλe. ∀w ∈ Dox(e)[p(w)]
(10) JArnie believes that Paul married a rich manKc = 1 iff
∃e[Exp(e) = a∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[rich-man(w)]]
Temporarily adopting the simplifying view that each individual has only one
belief state, suppose that Arnie’s belief state is ea, and Beatrice’s is eb. Thus, if a
sentence like (10) is true, it is because all of the worlds in Dox(ea) are rich man
worlds, meaning that ea satisfies the conditions in the scope of the existential quan-
tifier over events. With this in mind, a question we must address in making the leap
to non-distributive belief ascriptions is what the belief state is of a⊔b, the plurality
whose members are Arnie and Beatrice. While a variety of possibilities are on a
technical level compatible with my own proposal, I will adopt the seemingly plau-
sible view that it is ea⊔ eb, the sum of Arnie and Beatrice’s belief states. So for a
non-distributive belief ascription like (11), the witness to the existential quantifica-
tion over eventualities will be ea⊔ eb (if the sentence is true).
(11) JPaul’s cousins believe that pKc = 1 iff
∃e[Exp(e) = a⊔b∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[p(w)]]
With our basic assumptions now in place, we can state the problem at hand in
more formal terms. The original framing of the wedding scenario provided informa-
tion only about Arnie and Beatrice’s individual beliefs. That is, we were only given
information pertaining to Dox(ea) and Dox(eb). But this information was some-
how sufficient to determine the relevant properties of Dox(ea ⊔ eb) that made (6)
true, meaning that there must be some predictable relationship between Dox(ea),
Dox(eb), and Dox(ea ⊔ eb). More generally, given a plurally-experienced belief
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state e, there is some function J that makes (12) true, where Atm(e) is the set of
atomic (i.e., non-plural) belief states that make up e:
(12) Dox(e) = J({Dox(e′) | e′ ∈ Atm(e)})
We now turn to the task of defining J.
3.2 Analysis I: Premise negotiation
For those acquainted with Kratzer’s (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012) work on modality,
the facts discussed in the previous section might have a ring of familiarity to them.
This is because the types of inferences that arose in Section 2 are of the same sort
that motivated Kratzer’s well-known premise-semantic approach to modals. While
a full discussion of Kratzer’s theory and the evidence she marshals for it is beyond
the scope of this paper, a brief overview of a particular aspect of her theory will
help to highlight the parallels with our own data.
Suppose we have a set Q of propositions, where each proposition corresponds
to some obligation that our friend Linda is expected to fulfill. These obligations
can be whatever we like; we can even include in Q propositions that are logically
inconsistent with each other. Given this set of tasks, one might reasonably ask what
precisely it means for Linda to have maximally fulfilled her obligations, i.e., what
the set A of worlds is in which she has done as much as possible. If the obligations
are mutually compatible, then this is an easy question: for Linda to maximally fulfill
her obligations is for her to satisfy all of them. For example, if Linda is picking a
card and her obligations are to pick a diamond and to pick a queen, then the set of
worlds in which she maxes out on obligation fulfillment consists of those worlds
in which she picks the queen of diamonds. But things get trickier in cases where
Q is inconsistent. Here Linda is forced to make the best of a bad situation, since
she cannot fulfill all of the obligations in Q. Say for instance that in addition to the
two previous obligations of picking a diamond and picking a queen, we also add a
requirement that the card Linda picks be a king. Since she is picking only one card,
she cannot fulfill all three requirements, as that card cannot be both a queen and
a king. The best she can do is to satisfy two of the three requirements by picking
either the queen of diamonds or the king of diamonds.
There are many conceivable ways in which one could formalize this idea of
making the best of a bad situation. The most common way, following the work of
Lewis (1981) and Kratzer (1981), is to induce an ordering over worlds as in (13),
where w1 ≾Q w2 iff w1 is at least as ideal as w2 with respect to Q:
(13) w1 ≾Q w2 iff {p ∈ Q | p(w1)} ⊇ {p ∈ Q | p(w2)}
Put simply, w1 ≾Q w2 iff every proposition in Q that is true in w2 is also true in w1.
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{p,q1} {p,q2}
{q1} {p} {q2}
/0
more ideal
Figure 1 World-ordering in the toy example
Thus, w1 will be at least as ideal as w2 with respect to Linda’s obligation fulfillment
iff each task that is accomplished in w2 is also accomplished in w1.
As a toy example, say that Q = {p,q1,q2}, where p is consistent with each of
q1 and q2 (e.g., p∩q1 ̸= /0), but q1 and q2 are mutually incompatible (q1∩q2 = /0).
The world-ordering ≾Q for Q will then be as in Figure 1, where worlds are divided
into equivalence classes based on which propositions in Q hold in them. In this
case, the two clusterings of ideal worlds are those in which p and q1 both hold, and
those in which p and q2 both hold. Thus, the set of worlds in which obligations
are maximally satisfied is (p∩q1)∪ (p∩q2), or equivalently, p∩ (q1∪q2). Going
back to our example, if p is the set of worlds in which Linda chooses a diamond, q1
those in which she chooses a queen, and q2 those in which she chooses a king, then
we predict that those worlds in which Linda maximally fulfills her obligations are
those in which she picks the queen or king of diamonds.
A world-ordering algorithm such as (13) determines a particular relationship
between the propositions in Q and the set of worlds deemed ideal. As it turns out,
this relationship bears a strong prima facie resemblance to the relationship between
the beliefs of individuals and the beliefs of pluralities as discussed in the previous
section. In our toy premise-semantic example, q1 and q2 were incompatible with
each other, but compatible with p. As a result, the ideal worlds consisted of the
intersection of p with the union of q1 and q2, i.e., p∩ (q1∪q2). Meanwhile, in (8),
Beatrice and Kate’s beliefs about Paul’s husband’s hometown were incompatible
with each other, but compatible with Arnie’s belief about Paul’s husband’s wealth.
As a result, the plurality’s belief was the conjunction of Arnie’s belief with the
disjunction of Beatrice and Kate’s beliefs (rich and [New York or Iowa]).
With this parallelism in mind, our first analysis uses the algorithm in (13) to
define the function J in (12). This is formally stated in (14):
(14) Belief summing, Analysis I:
Dox(e) = BEST(≾{Dox(e′) | e′∈Atm(e)}) (where BEST(≾)≡ {w | ¬∃w′[w′ ≺ w]})
Notice that strictly speaking, (14) is only an indirect reflection of the parallel be-
tween premise semantics and belief negotiation as discussed in the previous para-
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graph. When this parallel was discussed above, it was as if the believed propositions
were serving as the premises, with the ideal worlds being those worlds that best
accorded with those beliefs. But that’s not what’s happening in (14): because we
are operating within a Hintikkan framework, the propositions serving as premises
are actually sets of belief worlds, rather than individually believed propositions.
Nonetheless, we will see that the same results are generated, though as discussed in
Section 4 some minor tweaks will eventually be needed.
Let’s go through each of the examples in Section 2 and see how our proposal
generates the right results. Starting with (4), let k1 through k6 be Sam’s six clients,
and let e1 through e6 be their corresponding belief states. I will use k1–6 as an
abbreviation for k1⊔k2⊔ . . .⊔k6, and likewise for e1–6 and e1⊔e2⊔ . . .⊔e6. In this
case, (4) will have the denotation in (15):
(15) J(4)Kc = 1 iff ∃e[Exp(e) = k1–6∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[six-houses(w)]]
As per the discussion above, k1–6’s belief state will be e1–6. In order to determine
whether (4) is true, then, we must find out what Dox(e1–6) is. By (14) this should be
the set of ideal worlds as determined by the premise set {Dox(e) | e ∈ Atm(e1–6)},
i.e., {Dox(ei) | 1≤ i≤ 6}. Importantly, the context for (4) dictates that each client
is agnostic about whether anyone else gets a house, so while every world in Dox(ei)
is such that ki gets a house, for every other client k j there will be some worlds in
Dox(ei) in which they get a house, and some worlds in which they do not. Because
of this general agnosticism, there are some worlds that are compatible with the be-
liefs of all six clients: namely, those worlds in which all six have a house built for
them. It is easily proven that given a premise set Q, if
⋂
Q is non-empty (meaning
the premises are all mutually compatible), then the set of ideal worlds as determined
by ≾Q will be
⋂
Q. Since the belief worlds of the six clients are mutually compat-
ible, the ideal worlds in this case will simply be
⋂{Dox(ei) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 6}. Because
these ideal worlds—the worlds compatible with the beliefs of all six clients—are
all worlds in which all six clients get a house from Sam, and this set of worlds has
been determined to be Dox(e1–6), we rightly predict (4) to be true, since e1–6 is a
successful witness to the existential quantification over events seen in (15).
For (6), we get essentially the same result, for essentially the same reason. We
predict (6) to have the denotation in (16):
(16) J(6)Kc = 1 iff ∃e[Exp(e) = a⊔b∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[rich-NYer(w)]]
Much like in the house-building scenario, Arnie and Beatrice are agnostic in just
the right ways to allow conjunction of their beliefs. While all worlds in Dox(ea)
(Arnie’s belief worlds) are worlds in which Paul’s husband is wealthy, because of
Arnie’s agnosticism about the husband’s hometown there will be some worlds in
which Paul’s husband is from New York, and some worlds in which he is not. Sim-
ilarly, there will be some worlds in Dox(eb) in which Paul’s husband is rich, and
553
Pasternak
{Dox(ea)} {Dox(eb)}
/0
Figure 2 World-ordering in the rich Marylander/poor New Yorker scenario
some in which he is not, but all of the worlds will be worlds in which Paul’s hus-
band is a New Yorker. Thus, Dox(ea) and Dox(eb) will have a non-empty intersec-
tion, meaning that Dox(ea⊔ eb), which is the set of ideal worlds given the premise
set {Dox(ea),Dox(eb)}, will be Dox(ea)∩Dox(eb). Since all Dox(ea) worlds are
rich man worlds, and all Dox(eb) worlds are New Yorker worlds, all Dox(ea⊔ eb)
worlds are rich New Yorker worlds, meaning that ea⊔ eb serves as a witness to the
event-quantification in (16).
Next up is (7), our first case of incompatibility. Our denotation is in (17):
(17) J(7)Kc = 1 iff ∃e[Exp(e) = a⊔b∧
∀w ∈ Dox(e)[rich-MDer(w)∨poor-NYer(w)]]
As was the case for (16), ea ⊔ eb will be the witness to our quantification over
events. Once again, Dox(ea ⊔ eb) will be the set of ideal worlds as determined by
the premise set {Dox(ea),Dox(eb)}. But for the new context, Dox(ea) and Dox(eb)
are incompatible: all of the worlds in Dox(ea) are worlds in which Paul’s husband is
a rich Marylander, and all of the worlds in Dox(eb) are worlds in which he is a poor
New Yorker. Since Paul’s husband cannot be both a rich Marylander and a poor
New Yorker, Dox(ea)∩Dox(eb) = /0. As a result of this incompatibility, the world-
ordering for premise set {Dox(ea),Dox(eb)} will be as in Figure 2, where worlds
are once again lumped into equivalence classes according to which propositions in
{Dox(ea),Dox(eb)} are true in them.
Given this ordering, the set of ideal worlds—and thus Dox(ea ⊔ eb)—will be
Dox(ea)∪Dox(eb). Since all of the worlds in Dox(ea) are rich Marylander worlds,
while all of the worlds in Dox(eb) are poor New Yorker worlds, this entails that all
of the worlds in Dox(ea⊔eb) are either rich Marylander worlds or poor New Yorker
worlds, meaning that we rightly predict (7) to be true. Moreover, we predict (6) to
be false here: not only are not all worlds in Dox(ea⊔ eb) rich New Yorker worlds,
but none of them are.
Finally, we have the most complex case, namely (8). Since this scenario involves
three cousins, we predict (8) to have the denotation in (18):
(18) J(8)Kc = 1 iff ∃e[Exp(e) = a⊔b⊔ k∧
∀w ∈ Dox(e)[rich(w)∧ (NYer(w)∨ Iowan(w))]]
In order to know whether (8) is true, we must determine what Dox(ea ⊔ eb ⊔ ek)
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{Dox(ea),Dox(eb)} {Dox(ea),Dox(ek)}
{Dox(eb)} {Dox(ea)} {Dox(ek)}
/0
Figure 3 World-ordering in the three-cousin scenario
is. Because Arnie is agnostic about Paul’s husband’s hometown, and Beatrice and
Kate are both agnostic about Paul’s husband’s wealth, Dox(ea) shares some worlds
in common with each of Dox(eb) and Dox(ek) (rich New Yorker worlds and rich
Iowan worlds, respectively). However, there are no worlds shared between Dox(eb)
and Dox(ek), since Paul’s husband cannot be from both New York and Iowa. As a
result, the world-ordering given the premise set {Dox(ea), Dox(eb), Dox(ek)} will
be as in Figure 3, very much parallel to the toy example given in Figure 1.
As can be seen in Figure 3, we now have two clusters of ideal worlds: those
worlds compatible with both Arnie and Beatrice’s beliefs (Dox(ea)∩Dox(eb)), and
those compatible with both Arnie and Kate’s beliefs (Dox(ea)∩Dox(ek)). Since the
former are all rich New Yorker worlds, while the latter are all rich Iowan worlds,
all of the ideal worlds are worlds in which Paul’s husband is a rich man from either
New York or Iowa. Since these ideal worlds make up Dox(ea⊔eb⊔ek), ea⊔eb⊔ek
successfully serves as a witness to the event-quantification in (18), meaning that we
rightly predict (8) to be true.
In short, then, we see that adopting Lewis-Kratzer premise negotiation as a way
of relating the belief worlds of individuals and pluralities generates the right re-
sults for the examples discussed in the previous section. Next we will look at an
alternative analysis with a somewhat simpler ontology, as well as a somewhat more
complex view of the semantics of plurals.
3.3 Analysis II: Beliefs under cover
Suppose we adopt a simpler principle of belief summing: Dox(ea⊔ eb) is the inter-
section of Dox(ea) and Dox(eb) if this intersection is non-empty, and is otherwise
undefined. This is stated for the more general case in (19):
(19) Belief summing, Analysis II:
Dox(e) is defined iff
⋂{Dox(e′) | e′ ∈ Atm(e)} ̸= /0.
Where defined, Dox(e) =
⋂{Dox(e′) | e′ ∈ Atm(e)}.
For the scenarios in which the beliefs of the individual experiencers were all mu-
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tually compatible (namely, (4) and (6)), (19) generates the same results as before,
since there the set of ideal worlds was the intersection of the individual experi-
encers’ belief worlds. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section (7) is true
on a distributive reading, meaning that this example is also unproblematic for the
simpler ontological principle in (19).
This just leaves the three-cousin case of (8). If we assume a denotation for
this sentence along the lines of (18) in conjunction with the principle in (19), we
do not predict truth. Since Beatrice and Kate’s beliefs are mutually incompati-
ble, Dox(eb) and Dox(ek) have an empty intersection, which in turn entails that
Dox(ea), Dox(eb), and Dox(ek) have an empty intersection. But this means that
Dox(ea⊔eb⊔ek) is undefined, so (18) will not return true. Since (8) is also false on
a distributive reading—that is, after all, what made the example interesting to begin
with—we are left without an explanation for the truth of (8).
However, we can regain an account of (8) if we adopt a more nuanced view
of the semantics of plural definites. More specifically, Gillon (1987, 1990) and
Schwarzschild (1996) have shown that distributive readings and “true” cumula-
tive/collective readings constitute two ends of a whole spectrum of possible in-
terpretations. Consider (20), due to Lasersohn (1989):1
(20) The TAs were paid exactly $14,000 last year.
Suppose that each of several courses was assigned two TAs, and that precisely
$14,000 in combined TA salary was allotted for each course. (20) can be true here,
in spite of being false on both a distributive reading (the TAs did not get $14,000
apiece) and a cumulative reading (the TAs got more than $14,000 total).
We can account for the truth of (20) by generalizing the notion of distributivity:
rather than always restricting ourselves to quantifying over the atomic individuals
that make up a plurality, as in the case of true distributivity, we can also quantify
over plural individuals whose sum is the plurality. That is, if x is the large plurality
in question (e.g., the sum of all of the TAs), we can quantify over the elements of
any contextually determined mereological cover of x, as defined in (21):2
(21) A is a mereological cover of x iff
⊔
A= x.
If Covc(x) is the contextually determined cover of x, then on this view the truth
conditions for (20) would be as semi-formally represented in (22):
(22) J(20)Kc = 1 iff ∀x ∈ Covc(the-TAs)[x was paid exactly $14,000]
1 Lasersohn actually uses (20), in a slightly different context, to argue against the sort of analysis es-
poused by Gillon and Schwarzschild. However, Gillon (1990) offers a convincing rebuttal to Laser-
sohn, and with our revised context (20) in fact becomes a convenient illustration of the theory.
2 Both Gillon and Schwarzschild adhere to a set-theoretic view of plurality in which pluralities are
sets of atomic individuals, in contrast to the Linkian lattice-theoretic framework adopted here (Link
1983). This distinction is immaterial for the analysis at hand.
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On the (false) distributive reading of (20), Covc(the-TAs) will be the set containing
all and only the individual TAs, so that the sentence will be true iff each of these
TAs was paid $14,000. On the (again false) cumulative reading, Covc(the-TAs) will
be a singleton set containing the mereological sum of all of the TAs; (20) will then
be true if this plurality earned exactly $14,000. Finally, on our intermediate reading,
Covc(the-TAs) will be a set of pluralities, where each plurality is a pair of TAs who
worked together on some course. The result is that (20) is true on this reading, since
each of the pairs in this set was paid exactly $14,000.
Let’s adopt this cover-based analysis, so that belief ascriptions will have a de-
notation templatically represented in (23):
(23) Jα believe(s) that pKc = 1 iff
∀x ∈ Covc(α)[∃e[Exp(e) = x∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[p(w)]]]
In those cases where the belief ascription is truly cumulative/collective—(4) and
(6)—Covc(α) will be the singleton set {α}, i.e., {k1–6} and {a⊔ b}, respectively.
Universally quantifying over this singleton set generates precisely the same truth
conditions as we had before covers were introduced, meaning that for these sen-
tences, which were unproblematic for the cover-free analysis, we continue to cor-
rectly predict truth. For (7), which is true on a distributive reading, Covc(a⊔ b)
will be {a,b}, meaning that we predict truth iff Arnie and Beatrice each believe the
weak proposition denoted by the embedded clause; since this is the case, (7) is true.
Finally, there is (8). Since the sum of the cousins in the three-cousin scenario is
a⊔b⊔k, we need to find out what Covc(a⊔b⊔k) is. Suppose that it’s {a⊔b,a⊔k}.
Note that it is not a problem that a appears twice here: (a⊔b)⊔ (a⊔ k) = a⊔b⊔ k,
so this set fits the conditions for a mereological cover as defined in (21). Given our
new coverful analysis of belief ascriptions, we now predict (8) to be true iff for
each (plural) individual in the set {a⊔ b,a⊔ k}, there is a state of that individual
believing that Paul’s husband is a rich man from either New York or Iowa.
For a⊔b, the belief state in question will be ea⊔eb. Since Dox(ea) and Dox(eb)
are mutually compatible, by (19) Dox(ea ⊔ eb) will be their intersection. Because
all Dox(ea⊔ eb) worlds are worlds in which Paul marries a rich New Yorker, it will
also be the case that all Dox(ea⊔ eb) worlds will be worlds in which Paul marries
a rich man from either New York or Iowa. We get the same thing for a⊔ k. Since
Dox(ea) and Dox(ek) are mutually compatible, Dox(ea⊔ek) =Dox(ea)∩Dox(ek),
meaning that all Dox(ea⊔ek)worlds are rich Iowan worlds, in turn entailing that all
Dox(ea⊔ ek) worlds are rich New Yorker or rich Iowan worlds. Thus each member
of the cover has a corresponding state of believing that Paul married a rich man
from New York or Iowa, meaning that we rightly predict (8) to be true.
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3.4 Summary
In this section, we have seen two ways of accounting for the observation that arose
in Section 2. The two theories were in agreement that cases where conjunctive in-
ferences arose were due to intersection of the sets of belief worlds of the individual
experiencers. Where the two theories differed was in their analyses of those cases
in which disagreements led to the licensing only of weaker, disjunctive inferences:
for the first theory, this was a result of the mechanisms of a Lewis-Kratzer premise
semantics, while for the second theory it was the result of a cover-based seman-
tics for plural definites. I will not argue for one of these theories over the other in
this paper. Instead, I will next turn to a problem faced by both of these theories as
currently formulated, namely, the problem of irrelevant disagreement.
4 Irrelevant disagreement and aboutness
4.1 The problem
Consider again the sentence in (6), this time in the revised context below:
As before, Arnie believes that Paul married a rich man, and Beatrice be-
lieves that he married a New Yorker, with no other relevant beliefs. In addi-
tion, Arnie mistakenly believes that Mozart was born in 1755, while Beatrice
correctly believes him to have been born in 1756.
(6) Paul’s cousins think he married a rich New Yorker.
It seems that (6) remains true in this new scenario, but we currently fail to pre-
dict this. The scenario dictates that all worlds in Dox(ea) are worlds in which
Mozart was born in 1755, and those in Dox(eb) worlds in which he was born in
1756. Assuming nobody thinks Mozart could have been born twice, this means that
Dox(ea)∩Dox(eb) = /0. Thus, on both of the analyses in the previous section, we
predict (6) to be false. Instead, the result should essentially be the same as in the
rich Marylander/poor New Yorker scenario in (7), in that the strongest claim we can
make should be the weaker (24):
(24) Paul’s cousins think he married someone who is rich or a New Yorker.
The conundrum we face, and the one that I will address in this section, is as
follows. As currently formulated, the highly relevant disagreements in (7) and (8)
and the completely irrelevant disagreement above have the same status: both entail
a non-overlap of belief worlds. But the two have different outcomes. We thus need a
way to “filter out” irrelevant disagreements between individual experiencers, while
retaining their relevant disagreements.
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4.2 Beliefs are about situations
The way in which I will filter out irrelevant disagreements between experiencers
will be by positing that beliefs are about situations, where situations are partial pos-
sible worlds and possible worlds are maximal situations (cf. Barwise & Perry 1983,
Kratzer 2002). On the semantic end of things, the denotation of believe will now
include an additional conjunct stating that the belief state is about a contextually
determined situation sc, as in (25):
(25) JbelieveKctake 2 = λ pλe. about(e) = sc∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[p(w)]
Importantly, if about(e) = s, then Dox(e) is the set of worlds compatible with
what the experiencer of e believes specifically about s. For example, my beliefs
about the situation containing my apartment might entail that I left the stove on, but
would not entail that my friends are at the Purple Pub. Meanwhile, my beliefs about
the situation containing the Purple Pub might entail that my friends are there, but
not that I left the stove on. This notion of “aboutness” of beliefs will serve to filter
out those beliefs that are contextually determined to be irrelevant, i.e., those that are
not about the situation under discussion.
Before showing how such aboutness can be used to account for (ir)relevance of
disagreement, one relatively harmless but nonetheless noteworthy stipulation must
be put in place. We have assumed—and will continue to assume—that Exp(e1⊔e2)
is Exp(e1)⊔Exp(e2). Furthermore, in the previous section we saw two possibilities
for the relationship between Dox(e1), Dox(e2), and Dox(e1 ⊔ e2). But now that
there is an additional conjunct in the definition of believe, we must ask what the
relationship is between about(e1), about(e2), and about(e1⊔e2). Once again, as far
as the mechanics of the proposal is concerned, this choice does not seem to matter.
However, I will assume that about(e1⊔e2) = about(e1)⊔s about(e2), where s1⊔s s2
is the sum of s1 and s2 (i.e., the minimal situation containing both s1 and s2).
Now let us see how aboutness can save us from the Mozart problem. The pre-
dicted denotation for Arnie thinks that Mozart was born in 1755 can be seen in
(26). The denotation for Beatrice thinks that Mozart was born in 1756 is the result
of swapping out a for b, and 1755 for 1756.
(26) JArnie thinks that Mozart was born in 1755Kc = 1 iff
∃e[Exp(e) = a∧ about(e) = sc∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[born-in-1755(w)]]
For our purposes, it does not matter what the situation is about which Arnie believes
that Mozart was born in 1755.3 All that matters is that such a situation exists and
can be picked out by context. In this case (26) is, of course, true.
3 One possibility is to say that for beliefs like this, which seem to be more general and less pinned
to particular situations, the about-situation is the whole world of utterance. But again, the theory at
hand does not require that we pinpoint a particular situation that this belief state is about.
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As for (6), suppose that swed is the situation containing, say, Paul’s wedding
and reception. While Arnie in general believes that Mozart was born in 1755, his
beliefs specifically about swed do not entail this. Thus, if eweda is Arnie’s belief state
about swed, Dox(eweda ) will contain some worlds in which Mozart was born in 1755,
some in which he was born in 1756, and some in which he was born in other years.
However, Dox(eweda ) will entail that Paul’s husband is a rich man, as this is a belief
Paul has about swed. Similar facts hold for ewedb , Beatrice’s belief state about s
wed:
Dox(ewedb ) will entail that Paul married a New Yorker, but not that Mozart was
born in 1756. Dox(eweda ) and Dox(e
wed
b ) therefore have a non-empty intersection,
meaning that on either of the analyses in the previous section Dox(eweda ⊔ ewedb ) is
this intersection. As a result, if the contextually determined about-situation is swed,
then there is a belief state that is about that situation, that has a⊔b as its experiencer,
and that is such that in all doxastic worlds, Paul marries a rich New Yorker: namely,
eweda ⊔ ewedb . In other words, we again predict (6) to be true.
4.3 Context-sensitivity
The proposal outlined above pins the distinction between relevant and irrelevant
disagreement to a contextually determined about-situation. As a result, whether or
not experiencers qualify as being in agreement is predicted to be a matter partially
determined by the context of utterance. In fact, this turns out to be a good thing.
For example, consider the following revision of the original context for (4) (the
house-building scenario):
Sam owns a construction company and has six clients, none of whom know
of the others’ existence. She has convinced each client that she would build
a house for him and him alone. In reality, she is a con artist and built no
houses at all.
In this revised context, (27) is clearly true:
(27) Each client believes that Sam built a house for him and him alone.
In order for (27) to be true, Sam’s six clients must have non-intersecting belief
worlds: all of Client 1’s belief worlds are worlds in which he gets a house, and
no one else (including Clients 2–6) does. Since there are no worlds in which six
different clients are the only client to get a house from Sam, there are no worlds
shared by all six clients’ belief states.
However, suppose that the six clients later find each other and catch on to Sam’s
scam. They then file a joint lawsuit against her. In this context, while justifying
the proposed amount of combined damages, it seems that the clients’ attorney can
truthfully say (28):
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(28) Each of the contracts was for a massive house worth over $5 million. So the
reason the combined damages are over $50 million is because Sam’s clients
thought she had built six very expensive houses for them.
While the lawyer is adding a bit of contextual backdrop, the underlined sentence in
(28) is essentially the same as that in (4).
So here is the issue. In order for (27) to be true, the six clients must have mutu-
ally contradictory beliefs, since each client’s beliefs exclude the possibility of any
other clients getting a house. But in order for (28) to come out as true, the clients’
beliefs must not count as mutually contradictory, in order for their six house-beliefs
to be conjoined into one six-house belief. In other words, the clients’ belief of ex-
clusivity qualifies as relevant for (27), but not for (28), since the exclusivity clause
is presumably irrelevant in the tabulation of combined damages.
To see how aboutness can account for this, imagine for simplicity’s sake that
each client ki’s contract with Sam is as in Figure 4. Situation si contains all and
only those portions of the contract that state that Sam will build a house for ki.
Meanwhile, s′i, which properly includes si, also includes those portions of the con-
tract guaranteeing that Sam will not build a house for anyone else. So much like in
the original house-building scenario for (4), ki’s beliefs about si entail that ki is get-
ting a house, but not necessarily that k j isn’t getting a house. But ki’s beliefs about
s′i entail not only that ki is getting a house, but also that ki is the only one getting a
house.
With our scenario now clarified, we can move on to (27) and (28). In order
to actually get (27) right, a slight tweak to the semantics is in order. To see why,
consider (29), which is what we currently predict the denotation for (27) to be:
(29) ∀x : client(x)[∃e[Exp(e) = x∧ about(e) = sc∧
∀w ∈ Dox(e)[only-house(x,w)]]]
The reason (29) is problematic is because it requires that all of the clients’ beliefs
be about the same situation sc. That is, there must be some situation (determined by
context) such that each client ki’s beliefs about that situation entail that ki and only
ki is getting a house. But that is not what we have here. Rather, ki’s beliefs are about
s′i, k j’s beliefs are about s′j, etc. Something must be changed in order to allow the
about-situation to vary across quantified-over experiencers.
To fix this we will modify the semantics for believe one more time. Rather than
requiring that the belief state be about some contextually determined situation sc,
our new definition will require that the belief state be about some element in a
contextually determined set Sc of situations:4
4 This has no effect on the Mozart example discussed earlier in this section, since all that is now
required is that swed ∈ Sc.
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Will build house for ki.
Won’t build for anyone besides ki.
si
s′i
Figure 4 About-situations for house-building, with and without exclusivity
(30) JbelieveKctake 3 = λ pλe. about(e) ∈ Sc∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[p(w)]
Naturally, the modified denotation for (27) will be as in (31):
(31) ∀x : client(x)[∃e[Exp(e) = x∧ about(e) ∈ Sc∧
∀w ∈ Dox(e)[only-house(x,w)]]]
If Sc = {s′i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 6}, we rightly predict (27) to be true: for each client ki, there
is some situation in Sc—namely, s′i—about which ki believes that he is the only one
to receive a house.
As for the underlined sentence in (28), the predicted truth conditions are as in
(32):
(32) ∃e[Exp(e) = k1–6∧ about(e) ∈ Sc∧∀w ∈ Dox(e)[six-houses(w)]]
Now suppose that for each client ki and situation si, ei is ki’s belief state about si.
Since si contains only the portion of ki’s contract guaranteeing him a house (and not
the part guaranteeing him exclusivity), for each other client k j, Dox(ei) is agnostic
about k j getting a house. So just like in the original house-building scenario for
(4), {Dox(ei) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} has a non-empty intersection, and in all worlds in that
intersection Sam builds six houses for her six clients. Thus, all Dox(e1–6) worlds
are six-house worlds. Plus, as stipulated above, about(e1–6) is s1–6, the sum of s1
through s6. We therefore predict (28) to be true if Sc contains s1–6, since there is a
state e1–6 that has experiencer k1–6 and about-situation s1–6, and that is such that in
all doxastic worlds Sam builds six houses for the six clients.
5 Conclusion
We have seen a variety of evidence suggesting that (I) it is possible for a plurality
to believe p without any of its atomic parts believing p, and (II) the beliefs of a
plurality are to a significant extent predictable from the beliefs of its atomic parts.
I have offered two analyses for the facts discussed in Section 2: one in which all
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of the work was accomplished by a robust principle of belief summing, and one
that utilized a more slimmed-down ontology together with a more robust semantics
for plurals. I then discussed a problem faced by both of these analyses, namely the
problem of irrelevant agreement, and offered a solution in terms of the “aboutness”
of beliefs. I now conclude by detailing two areas for possible future research.
First, while I have stuck to believe and think in this paper, other attitudes like
want allow for non-distributive readings as well:
Sam has six clients, who do not know each other. Each client has asked Sam
to build a house for him.
(33) Sam’s six clients want her to build six houses for them.
Extending our current analysis of believe to want poses two new challenges. The
first is that the semantics for want has generally been taken to be more complex
than the semantics for believe; more specifically, broadly Hintikkan analyses forJwantK generally utilize an ordering relation over possible worlds in terms of their
preferability to the experiencer (see, e.g., Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999; Büring 2003;
Villalta 2008; Anand & Hacquard 2008, 2013; Rubinstein 2012, 2017; Phillips-
Brown 2018). Thus, new principles need to be devised elucidating the relationship
between the world-orderings of atomic desire states and those of their sums. In
addition, Pasternak (2018, to appear) provides evidence suggesting that states of
desire have a robust mereology all on their own, completely independent of the
issue of plurality. This adds another layer of complexity to any account of non-
distributive desire ascriptions.5
Second, over the course of discussion of this material it was brought to my at-
tention that Schmitt (2017) has similarly argued for the existence of cumulative (and
thus non-distributive) belief ascriptions. However, much of the data she discusses
are quite different from what was covered in this paper, with the result being that
her analysis and my own differ sharply. It is up to future work to determine what the
relationship is between Schmitt’s facts and analysis and my own, and perhaps how
they might be combined in order to account for the sum of the available evidence.
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